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ABSTRACT
We incorporate costly external finance in an investment-based asset pricing model and investigate
whether financing frictions are quantitatively important for pricing a cross-section of expected
returns. We show that common assumptions about the nature of the financing frictions are captured
by a simple “financing cost” function, equal to the product of the financing premium and the amount
of external finance. This approach provides a tractable framework for empirical analysis. Using
GMM, we estimate a pricing kernel that incorporates the effects of financing constraints on
investment behavior. The key ingredients in this pricing kernel depend not only on “fundamentals”,
such as profits and investment, but also on the financing variables, such as default premium and the
amount of external financing. Our findings, however, suggest that the role played by financing
frictions is fairly negligible, unless the premium on external funds is procyclical, a property not
evident in the data and not satisfied by most models of costly external finance.
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In this paper we ask whether ﬁnancing constraints are quantitatively important in explaining
a cross-section of expected returns. Speciﬁcally, we incorporate costly external ﬁnance into
a production based asset pricing model similar to Cochrane (1991, 1996) and explore the
Euler equation restrictions imposed on returns by the optimal production and investment
decisions of ﬁrms.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. First, we show that standard costly external ﬁnance models
can be summarized by a parsimonious “ﬁnancing cost” function that is independent of
the underlying sources of ﬁnancial frictions (e.g., asymmetric information, costly state
veriﬁcation or “lemon problems”) and is given by the product of the premium on external
ﬁnance and the amount of external ﬁnance. Moreover, since both the ﬁnancing premium and
the amount of external ﬁnance can be mapped into observable data, this theoretical result
also provides a tractable empirical framework to investigate the importance of ﬁnancing
frictions.
Our empirical results imply that either: (a) ﬁnancing frictions do not play an important
role behind the observed ﬂuctuations in the cross-section of expected returns; or (b) if
ﬁnancing frictions are important, the true premium on external ﬁnance must be procyclical, a
property not shared by standard empirical proxies such as measures of the default premium.
These results are robust to alternative measures of the default premium, “fundamentals”
such as proﬁts and investment, alternative moment conditions, and alternative functional
forms for the ﬁnancing cost function.
The intuition for our results is simple. The empirical success of investment based
asset pricing lies in the alignment of the returns on physical investment and stock returns
(Cochrane (1991)). Given the cyclical behavior of fundamentals like investment and
1productivity, and the forward looking nature of ﬁrm optimization, current investment reacts
to news about expected future productivity. This generates a series of investment returns
that leads the cycle and is positively correlated with future proﬁts — thus matching the
observed behavior of stock returns as documented by Fama and Gibbons (1982). With
costly external ﬁnance, however, an expected rise in future productivity is also associated
with lower future expected ﬁnancing costs since the default premium is countercyclical. This
additional eﬀect creates an incentive for ﬁrms to try to capitalize on the lower expected costs
by delaying their investment response, thus changing the implied dynamics of investment
returns and lowers their correlation with the observed stock returns.
Our results contribute to two strands of the literature in ﬁnance and macroeconomics.
First, from an empirical asset pricing perspective, they suggest that ﬁnancing variables are
not an important common factor in pricing the cross-section of expected asset returns and
cast doubt on the interpretation of the Fama and French (1993, 1996) size and book-to-
market eﬀects as proxies for a ﬁnancial distress factor.1 Instead, our evidence seems to
support recent work that emphasizes the role of ﬁrm productivity and growth in generating
the observed cross-sectional variations in returns.2 Our results are also consistent with the
view that ﬁnancial distress is mostly an idiosyncratic phenomenon that does not aﬀect returns
in a systematic way.3 Finally, our ﬁndings can also be interpreted as providing additional
evidence against models of ﬁnancing frictions that rely on costly external ﬁnance.4
Second, in the macroeconomic literature, several authors have argued that ﬁnancing
1For example Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985), Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and Chan and Chen (1991)
2Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2002), and Zhang (2002).
3For example, Opler and Titman (1994), Asquith, Gertner, and Sharfstein (1994) and Lamont, Polk, and
Sa´ a-Requejo (2001).
4For example a recent strand of literature has focused instead on “quantity” constraints (e.g. Kehoe
and Levine (1993), Kotcherlakotta (1996), Zhang (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2001), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2001), Cooley, Quadrini, and Marimon (2001), and Almeida
and Campello (2002)).
2constraints provide a powerful propagation mechanism, through ﬂuctuations in asset prices,
to amplify exogenous shocks and thus improve the ability of business-cycles models to
replicate the behavior of typical macro aggregates.5 Our ﬁndings suggest that those models’
ability to match ﬁnancial data is severely strained unless the implied costs of external ﬁnance
are procyclical, thus placing important restrictions on the type of models of ﬁnancing frictions
supported by the data.6
In addition to Cochrane (1991, 1996), we also build on work by Restoy and Rockinger
(1994) who generalize some of the results in Cochrane (1991) to an environment with
investment constraints, and Bond and Meghir (1994) who characterize the eﬀects of ﬁnancing
frictions on the optimal investment decisions of the ﬁrm. Our work is also related to research
by Li, Vassalou and Xing (2001) who compare the performance of alternative investment
growth factors in pricing the Fama and French (1993) size and book to market portfolios,
and to Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) who re-examine the empirical link between aggregate
investment and stock returns using information contained in consumption-to-wealth ratio.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that much of the
existing literature on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints can be characterized by specifying a simple
dynamic problem describing ﬁrm behavior. Section 2 also derives the expression for returns
to physical investment, and its relation to stock and bond returns, which can be used to
evaluate the asset pricing implications of the model. The next section describes our data
sources and econometric methods, while Section 4 reports the results of our GMM tests
and examines both the performance of the model and the role of ﬁnancing constraints. The
robustness of our results to the use of alternative data or modelling assumptions is examined
5For example Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000), and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1999).
6Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) also acknowledge that the ability of ﬁnancing frictions models to replicate
key business cycle properties leads to a procyclical ﬁnancing premium.
3in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section we incorporate costly external ﬁnance in Cochrane’s (1996) investment-
based asset pricing framework. We achieve this by summarizing the common properties
of alternative models of ﬁnancing frictions with a very weak set of restrictions on the costs of
external funds. We then show that this formulation leads to a fairly simple characterization
of the optimal investment decisions of the ﬁrm and derive a set of easily testable asset pricing
conditions that can potentially shed light on the role of ﬁnancing frictions.
2.1 Modelling Financing Frictions
Theoretical foundations of ﬁnancing frictions have been provided by several researchers over
the years and we do not attempt to provide yet another rationalization for their existence.
Rather, we seek to summarize the common ground across much of the existing literature with
a representation of ﬁnancing constraints that is both parsimonious and empirically useful.
While exact assumptions and modelling strategies can diﬀer quite signiﬁcantly across the
various models, most share the key feature that external ﬁnance (equity or debt) is more
“costly” than internal funds. It is this crucial property that we explore in our analysis below
by assuming that the ﬁnancial market imperfections will be entirely captured by the unit
costs of raising external ﬁnance.
Consider ﬁrst the case of equity ﬁnance. Suppose a ﬁrm issues N dollars in new shares
and let W denote the reduction on the claim of existing shareholders associated with the
issue of one dollar of new equity. Clearly, in a Modigliani-Miller world, W = 1 since the
total value of the ﬁrm is unaﬀected by ﬁnancing decisions. If Modigliani-Miller fails to hold
4however, new equity lowers the total value of the ﬁrm, and W>1. New issues are costly to
existing shareholders, not only because they reduce claims on future dividends, but because
they also reduce value due to the presence of additional transaction or informational costs.7
Suppose now that the ﬁrm decides to use debt ﬁnancing, B, and let the function R denote
the future repayment costs of this debt.8 If Modigliani-Miller holds these repayments will
just equal the opportunity cost of internal funds, captured by the relevant discount factor for
shareholders, M. In this case we will simply have that E[MR(·)] = 1, where E[·] denotes the
expectation over the relevant probability measure. Absent Modigliani-Miller, debt is more
costly than internal funds and E[MR(·)] > 1, at least when B>0.
In addition, it is often assumed that the “ﬁnancing costs” are increasing in the amount
of external ﬁnance, so that ∂W(·)/∂N and ∂R(·)/∂B are positive. It also seems reasonable
to assume that the costs depend on the amount of ﬁnancing normalized by ﬁrm size, K,
which allows for the possibility that large ﬁrms will face lower ﬁnancing costs. Finally, these
costs may also be state-dependent. In this case we would write W(·)=W (N/K,S), where
S summarizes both ﬁrm-level and aggregate uncertainty, and similarly R(·)=R(B/K,S).
These additional properties are also common and fairly intuitive. We summarize them
in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 Let S summarize all forms of uncertainty. The cost functions W(·) and
R(·) satisfy:
W(N/K,S) > 1,W 1(·) ≡ ∂W(·)/∂N ≥ 0 for N>0( 1 )
7E.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984)
8If there is no possibility of default these costs will just equal the gross interest on the loan. If default is
allowed, they may depend on the liquidation value of the ﬁrm.
5and
Et[MR(B/K,S)] ≥ 1,R 1(·) ≡ ∂R(·)/∂B ≥ 0 for B>0( 2 )
This is a very weak assumption as it merely requires that external ﬁnance, whether debt
or equity, is more expensive than internal funds, with non-decreasing unit costs.
Essentially, a large portion of the existing literature on ﬁnancing constraints has focused
so far on establishing the nature and properties of the functions W(·)a n dR(·), by
concentrating on optimal contracts in the presence of transaction costs, moral hazard or
asymmetric information. These alternative arguments provide diﬀerent rationales, and
sometimes diﬀerent forms, for the functions W(·)a n dR(·), but most share the basic
properties captured by Assumption 1. By focusing on the common ground across much
of this existing literature on ﬁnancing frictions, we seek to provide a fairly general test of
the role that these constraints play in determining asset prices.
2.1.1 Example: Asymmetric Information
A very popular strand of literature focuses on the costs associated with the existence of
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders.9 Here we brieﬂy sketch a fairly
general example of this well-known class of models and show how it ﬁts into our general
approach, summarized in Assumption 1. The virtues of this popular formulation are
simplicity and descriptive realism. Moreover, since debt ﬁnance accounts for 75% to 100%
of the total amount of external funds used by corporate ﬁrms, this is, by far, the most
empirically relevant example.10
Consider the problem of a ﬁrm that has access to stochastic technology that purchases K
9E.g., Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 1999).
10Source: Federal Reserve U.S. Flow of Funds Data.
6units of productive capacity to produce AK units of output. Assume that productivity, A,
is an i.i.d. random variable with a cumulative distribution Φ(·) over a non-negative support,
and an increasing hazard function dΦ(A)/(1−dΦ(A)).11 Moreover, suppose that productivity
is freely observed only by the ﬁrm. Lenders can only observe A by paying a monitoring cost
of µK units of capital.
To ﬁnance its purchases of capital goods, the ﬁrm can use internal funds in the amount of
F, or it can borrow an amount B from a lender or a bank. It follows that the ﬁrm’s resource
constraint is given by K = F +B.12 Loans are repaid, with interest R, after production has
taken place. However, if the ﬁrm defaults, the lender seizes the entire value of production,
net of monitoring costs. It follows that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to default if, and only if,
A<A = R × B/K
Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that the optimal lending contract between the two parties













where (3) denotes the expected payoﬀ to the ﬁrm and (4) guarantees that the return on the
loan, at least, compensates the lender for the opportunity cost of the funds, Rf. Because
the lender must pay the auditing cost, µK, to observe productivity, borrowing rates will
generally exceed lending rates, or the opportunity cost of funds for the lender. While a
detailed characterization of this problem is available in the literature, and is quite beyond
11This property is satisﬁed by most c.d.f. including the normal and log-normal distributions.
12If F>Kwe can think of B as a ﬁnancial asset, for example a bank deposit. Naturally, since this is not
private information, its payoﬀ is riskless.
7the scope of this paper, Proposition 1 derives the expression for the optimal lending rate, R.




Moreover ρ (·) > 0.
Proof See Appendix A
Proposition 1 establishes that this class of models falls within the general characterization
summarized by Assumption 1. The interest rate on loans can be represented by an increasing
function of the amount of external ﬁnance. Moreover, this rate will always exceeds the risk
free rate, unless the ﬁrm does not require ﬁnancing.13 Finally, in this case, the premium on
external funds is entirely due to the need to compensate the lender for the costs associated
with default. Clearly then, the ﬁnancing premium in this model corresponds exactly to a
“default” premium.
2.2 Firm’s Problem
We now embed the costly external ﬁnance Assumption 1 within a general dynamic production
asset pricing model. Accordingly, consider the problem of a ﬁrm seeking to maximize the
value to existing shareholders, denoted V , in an environment where external ﬁnance is costly.
This ﬁrm makes investment decisions by choosing the optimal amount of capital to have at
the beginning of the next period, Kt+1. Investment spending, It,a sw e l la sd i v i d e n d s ,Dt,
can be ﬁnanced with internal cash ﬂows Π(Kt,S t), new equity issues, Nt, or one-period debt
Bt+1.14
13This result is quite general and holds regardless of the exact form of ﬁnancing used (see Stein (2001) for
a simple illustration).
14One-period debt simpliﬁes the algebra considerably but has no bearing on our results.
8The problem of this ﬁrm can then be summarized by the following dynamic program:
V (Kt,B t,S t)= m a x
Dt,Bt+1,
Kt+1,Nt
{Dt − W (Nt/Kt,S t)Nt +E t [Mt,t+1V (Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)]} (6)
s.t.D t = Ct + Nt + Bt+1 − R(Bt/Kt,S t)Bt (7)
It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt,δ ≥ 0( 8 )







Kt a ≥ 0( 9 )
Dt ≥ D, Nt ≥ 0
where Mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor (of the owners of the ﬁrm) from time t to
t +1a n dD is the ﬁrm’s minimum, possibly zero, dividend payment. Note that ﬁrms can
accumulate ﬁnancial assets, in which case debt is negative. We assume that the cash ﬂow
function, Π(·), exhibits constant returns scale, but its exact form is not important.
Equation (7) shows the resource constraint of the ﬁrm. It implies that dividends must
equal internal funds, net of investment spending, Ct, plus new external funds, net of debt
repayments. Equation (8) is the standard capital accumulation equation, relating current
investment spending, It, to future capital, Kt+1. We assume that old capital depreciates at
the rate δ. As in Cochrane (1991, 1996), investment requires the payment of adjustment
costs, captured by the term (a/2)[It/Kt]
2 Kt.
Given our assumptions, it is immediate that the ﬁrm will only use external ﬁnance after
internal cash ﬂows are exhausted and no dividends are paid, above the required level D.
Conversely, dividends will exceed this minimum only if no external funds are required to
ﬁnance them. Hence, the model extends the familiar hierarchical ﬁnancing structure derived
by Myers (1984) in a static framework to a dynamic setting.
92.3 Asset Pricing Implications
To establish the asset pricing implications of the model we begin by eliminating investment by
combining the constraints (7) and (9). Letting µt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated
with this combined constraint, the optimal ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Kt+1 and
Bt+1 are, respectively:
µtC2(Kt,K t+1,S t)+E t [Mt,t+1V1(Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)] = 0 (10)
µt +E t [Mt,t+1V2(Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)] = 0 (11)























t+1 denote the returns on physical investment and debt, respectively.
Equations (12) and (13) completely summarize of the role of ﬁnancing constraints for the
optimal behavior of ﬁrms. However, this characterization is extremely diﬃcult to implement
empirically, since it requires an explicit solution to the value function, V (Kt,B t,S t), as well
as the multiplier, µt. More importantly, this procedure would require much more stringent
assumptions about the functional forms of the cost functions, W and R, than those provided
in Assumption 1, thus limiting the generality of our conclusion.
Instead, we pursue an alternative approach by exploiting the fact that the solution to
the problem above can be characterized by solving the following “frictionless” problem
 V (Kt,B t,S t)=m a x
Kt+1

 C(Kt,K t+1,S t)+E t





10where  V denotes the total value of the ﬁrm for both stock and bond holders, and cash ﬂows
are now deﬁned by:
 C(Kt,K t+1,S t)=C(Kt,K t+1,S t) − b(St)Xt (15)
where the last term equals the product of the premium on external ﬁnance, b(St), and the
amount of external ﬁnancing used by the ﬁrm, Xt≡Bt+1+Nt. Note also that the resource
constraint (7) implies that Xt equals:15
Xt ≡ Bt+1 + Nt = RtBt + D − C(Kt,K t+1,S t) (16)
Proposition 2 establishes the equivalence between problem (14) and the original formulation
(6).
Proposition 2 Let the adjusted cash ﬂow function  C(·) be given by (15). Then:
(i) the two dynamic programs (6) and (14) are equivalent;
(ii) ﬁnancing constraints are completely summarized by the “ﬁnancing cost” function:
b(St)Xt,b (St) ≥ 0 (17)




 C1(Kt+1,K t+2,S t+1)
− C2(Kt,K t+1,S t)
= −
(1 + b(St+1))C1(Kt+1,K t+2,S t+1)
(1 + b(St))C2(Kt,K t+1,S t)
, (18)
Proof. We present the proof for the case of equity ﬁnance only. The proof for the case
with debt is provided in Appendix A. When ﬁrms have no debt Xt =Nt and replacing the
15Recall that Xt ≥ 0 implies Dt = D, since it is not optimal for ﬁrms to issue new equity or debt while
paying out excessive dividends.
11resource constraints in (6) yields:
V (Kt,S t)= m a x
Kt+1,Nt
{C(Kt,K t+1,S t) − (W(·) − 1)Nt +E t [Mt,t+1V (Kt+1,S t+1)]}
Letting b(·)=W(Nt/Kt,S t)−1 be the premium on external ﬁnance, it follows that:
 C(Kt,K t+1,S t)=C(Kt,K t+1,S t) − (W(·) − 1)Nt.
(i) and (ii) thus follow. Part (iii) follows from the fact that
∂Xt/∂Kt = −C1(·); ∂Xt/∂Kt+1 = −C2(·).
While the proof for the case of debt ﬁnancing requires a fairly elaborate veriﬁcation of
integrability conditions, the basic argument of the proof lies in the characterization of the
multiplier. In some sense this proposition merely explores the fact that one can always
rewrite a constrained problem as an unconstrained one with embedded multipliers. What is
novel here is the precise characterization of the multiplier, µt, as a measure of the premium
on external ﬁnance. By linking this “shadow-price” to an essentially observable variable, we
are able to recast the problem in a way that is amenable to empirical analysis. Moreover,
our ﬁnancing cost function provides a very simple, but quite general, characterization of the
ﬁnancing constraints.16
16Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) examine the eﬀect of ﬁnancing frictions on investment by simply
specifying a similar cost function. However, they do not provide a formal argument to link this representation
with the underlying assumptions in models of costly external ﬁnance.
122.4 Constructing Investment Returns




(1 + b(St+1))(πt+1 + a
2i2
t+1 +( 1+ait+1)(1 − δ))
(1 + b(St))(1 + ait)
(19)
where i≡(I/K) is the investment-to-capital ratio, and π ≡(Π/K) is the proﬁts-to-capital
ratio.









where ˆ RI denotes the investment return with no ﬁnancing costs which is entirely driven
by the two “fundamentals”, i and π. The role of the ﬁnancing frictions is then captured
by the term
1+b(St+1)
1+b(St) and it depends only on the properties of the ﬁnancing premium. This
implementation is very appealing empirically, since it requires only a measure of the premium
on external ﬁnance as well as data on the two fundamentals.
2.5 Financing Premium
To complete our description of investment returns all that is needed is a speciﬁcation for the
premium on external ﬁnance, b(St).
2.5.1 The Default Premium
Section 2.1.1 suggests one obvious candidate: For a large class of models the premium on
external funds, b(St), is exactly equal to the premium necessary to compensate lenders for
the possibility of default.
In addition to our formal arguments, the use of the default premium can also be justiﬁed
13by its popularity in much of the existing literature. Speciﬁcally, the ability of default
premium to track movements in asset prices has long been recognized. As a consequence the
default premium is a common choice in many reduced form asset pricing tests.17 In addition,
the default premium is also a very good predictor of business cycle ﬂuctuations.18 Finally,
and perhaps more importantly, the default premium is also frequently used as a measure of
the premium of external funds in several applications of models of ﬁnancing frictions.19
Given these arguments, it seems then natural to use the default premium to construct
an empirical counterpart to the theoretical premium b(·).
2.5.2 Other Measures
Although the default premium provides a set of benchmark results for our analysis we also
use a variety of additional measures of the ﬁnancing premium. First, Propositions 1 and
2 formally establish that the ﬁnancing premium is increasing in the amount of external
ﬁnance (relative to size). Given our results, this variable should be closely related to the
actual ﬁnancing costs, and is independent of the exact source of ﬁnancing. Empirically, this
means that we can also construct a good proxy for b(·) by looking only at the behavior of
the external ﬁnance, X/K.
In addition, we also look at two new measures of the cost of external ﬁnance: the common
factor of ﬁnancial constraints constructed in Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001), and the
aggregate default likelihood measure constructed by Vassalou and Xing (2002). These two
measures are described in detail below. Together, these alternative measures complement our
benchmark analysis and provide a fairly exaustive analysis of the robustness of our results.
17E.g., Fama (1981), Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Chen (1991), Fama and
French (1993), and Jagannathan and Wang (1996).
18E.g., Harvey (1989), Bernanke (1990), and Stock and Watson (1989, 1999).
19E.g., Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Bernanke and Gertler
(1995), Denis and Denis (1995), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 1999).
142.5.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our empirical analysis below, uses these two alternative approaches to construct, and
estimate, our model. More speciﬁcally, our approach will be to specify that the ﬁnance
premium, b(St), of the form
b(St)=b0 + b1 × ft. (21)
where b0 and b1 are parameters to be estimated and ft is a common factor capturing ﬁnancing
constraints. Examples of such factors will include measures of the default premium or the
ratio of external ﬁnance to capital.20
Although equation (21) seems relatively simple, the identiﬁcation of the constant term,
b0, is non-trivial. This is easier to see when b1=0 .I nt h i sc a s e( 2 0 )i m p l i e st h a tRI ≡ ˆ RI,
regardless of the actual value of b0. Thus, regardless of its actual level, if the ﬁnancing
premium has no time variation, ﬁnancing constraints do not aﬀect returns. This invariance
persists even when b1 is not exactly zero.21 The intuition is simple: asset returns essentially
involve ﬁrst diﬀerences, thus constants, like b0, do not aﬀect them.
This observation has important consequences. First, it implies that to explain asset
returns what matters are the dynamic properties of the ﬁnancing premium (identiﬁed by
b1) and not the overall level (captured by b0). Second, since we are not able to identify the
value of b0, our results do not shed light on the overall magnitude of the ﬁnancing premium.
Thus, even if ﬁnancing frictions do not aﬀect returns they can still aﬀect investment since
b0 may not necessarily be zero.
20Note that, without measurement error our example in section 2.1.1 implies that b(·) = Default Premium,
so that b0 =0 , and b1 =1 .




(1 + b0 + b1 × dt)2 ≈ 0, (22)
since b1 is small and |dt+1 − dt| is very close to 0.
15Finally, our theoretical results suggest that we should require both that the overall
premium and coeﬃcient b1 be non-negative. We will refer to this as the “restricted” version
of the model. For completeness however, we also report the results for an “unconstrained”
model where the we allow b1 < 0.
3 Investment-Based Factor Pricing Models
This section describes our empirical methodology in detail and also provides an overview of
our data sources and the construction of the series of returns.
3.1 Asset Pricing Tests
The essence of our strategy is to use the information contained in the asset prices restrictions
above to formally investigate the importance of ﬁnancing constraints. As we have seen in





l,t+1) = 1 (23)
for investment returns, RI
n,t+1, n =1 ,2,...JI, and bond returns RB
l,t+1, l =1 ,2,...JB.I n
addition, Proposition 3 shows a similar restriction must also hold for stock returns RS
j,t+1,
j =1 ,2,..JS.
Proposition 3 Stock returns satisfy the following conditions
Et(Mt,t+1R
S





t+1 +( 1− ωt)R
B
t+1 (25)
where (1 − ωt) is the leverage ratio.
16Proof See Appendix A
Although the proof is somewhat elaborate, equation (25) merely states that investment
returns are a weighted average of stock and bond returns. Given (23) and (25) it is immediate
to verify that stock returns must satisfy the moment condition (24).
Equations (23)-(25) oﬀer two alternative ways to examine the asset pricing implications
of ﬁnancing frictions. The identity (25) focuses on ex-post returns, while the Euler equations
(23) and (24) are about expected returns. Thus, ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks may play an important
role in examining the former, but only systematic risk is relevant for the latter.22
Speciﬁcally, we follow Cochrane (1996) and use a pricing kernel that depends only on the
returns to aggregate investment and a bond index:





a speciﬁcation that only requires individual returns to be approximately linear in aggregate
returns.23
The role of ﬁnancing constraints in explaining the cross-section of expected returns as a
common factor is captured by its inﬂuence on RI in the pricing kernel (26). As with any asset
pricing model, ﬁnancial frictions will be relevant for the pricing of expected returns only to
the extent that they provide a common factor — in this context one associated with ﬁnancial
distress as systematic (aggregate) risk, e.g. Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French
(1992, 1993, 1996) — that can potentially inﬂuence the stochastic discount factor. Cross-
22In Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2002) we investigate the importance of ﬁnancing constraints on both
systematic and idiosyncratic components of risk by testing the restriction (25) using panel data.
23From Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Hansen and Richard (1987) we know that one pricing kernel that









l . Stock returns can be eliminated since (25) implies





t+1 +  d,t+1 for portfolio d and the  d,t+1 be i.i.d. This is only a statement
about technologies and not about market completeness, and it appears reasonable provided that the level of
portfolio disaggregation is not too ﬁne.
17sectional variations in ﬁrms’s ﬁnancing constraints may be important in pricing asset returns
only to the extent that they aﬀect the aggregate systematic risk. Unlike the consumption-
based literature on asset pricing, where the use of the cross-sectional distribution was
motivated by the lack of success of aggregate consumption-based models (see, for example,
Constantinides and Duﬃe, 1996), aggregate investment returns actually work very well in
pricing the cross-section of returns (Cochrane, 1996); thus, the scope for ﬁrm heterogeneity
aﬀecting the systematic risk for ﬁnancial distress seems fairly limited.
As we can see from (19), information about the degree of ﬁnancial frictions is contained in
investment returns, which will then serve as a factor capturing the extent to which aggregate
ﬁnancial conditions are priced. In this sense, our formulation is essentially a structural
version of an APT-type framework in which one of the factors proxies for an aggregate
distress variable (and where diﬀerent portfolios have varying loadings on this factor), such
as that taken in Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-Requejo (2000).
However, the relative merit of our structural approach is that it can not only answer the
question of whether ﬁnancing constraints aﬀect expected returns, but also shed light on
questions like how and why they aﬀect returns.
To sum up, our metric for evaluating whether ﬁnancing frictions are important is whether
they show as a common factor or aﬀect systematic risk for the cross-section of returns. This
seems standard from the perspective of asset pricing.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
Our estimation strategy allows us to estimate factor loadings, l, as well as the parameters,
a and b, by utilizing M as speciﬁed in (26) in conjunction with moment conditions (23).
We follow Cochrane’s (1996) estimation techniques for assessing the asset pricing
18implications of our model. Speciﬁcally, three alternative sets of moment conditions in
implementing (23) are examined. First, we look at the relatively weak restrictions implied by
the unconditional moments. We then focus on the conditional moments by scaling returns
with instruments, and ﬁnally we look at time variation in the factor loadings, by scaling the
factors.
For the unconditional factor pricing we use standard GMM procedures to minimize a
weighted average of the sample moments (23). Letting

T denote the sample mean, we can
rewrite these moments, gT as:
gT ≡ gT(a,b0,b 1,l) ≡

T [MR − p]
where R =[ RS,R I(y;a,b0,b 1),R B] is the menu of asset returns being priced, p =[1,1,1] is
a vector of prices, and y =( i,π,d). One can then choose (a,b0,b 1,l) to minimize a weighted




A convenient feature of our setup is that, given the cost parameters, the criterion function
above is linear in l — the factor loading coeﬃcients. Standard χ2 tests of over-identifying
restrictions follow from this procedure. This also provides a natural framework to assess
whether the loading factors or technology parameters are important for pricing assets.24
It is straightforward to include the eﬀects of conditioning information by scaling the
returns by instruments. The essence of this exercise lies in extracting the conditional
implications of (23) since, for a time-varying conditional model, these implications may
24Note that the investment return appears both in the pricing kernel and the menu of assets being priced.
As Cochrane (1996) notes, this consistency is required so that investment returns do not have arbitrary
properties.
19not be well captured by a corresponding set of unconditional moment restrictions as was
noted by Hansen and Richard (1987).
To test conditional predictions of (23), we expand the set of returns to include returns
scaled by instruments to obtain the moment conditions:
E[pt ⊗ zt]=E[ Mt,t+1 (Rt+1 ⊗ zt)]
where zt is some instrument in the information set at time t and ⊗ denotes Kronecker
product.
A more direct way to extract the potential non-linear restrictions embodied in (23) is to
let the stochastic discount factor be a linear combination of factors with weights that vary
over time. That is, the vector of factor loadings l is a function of instruments z that vary
over time.25 Therefore, to estimate and test a model in which factors are expected to price
assets only conditionally, we simply expand the set of factors to include factors scaled by











Finally, to circumvent the identiﬁcation issue discussed in Section 2.5, we set b0
beforehand to such that the implied share of the ﬁnancing costs in investment positive
and always equal to 3%. We also show that, as expected, our results are not aﬀected by this
particular choice.
25With suﬃciently many powers of z s the linearity of l can actually accommodate nonlinear relationships.
203.3 Data
This section provides an overview of the data used in our study. A more detailed description
is provided in Appendix B. Our data for the economic aggregates comes from NIPA and
the Flow of Funds Accounts. Information about ﬁnancial assets is obtained from CRSP
and Ibbotson. The construction of investment returns requires data on proﬁts, investment
and capital. Capital consumption data is used to compute the time series average of the
depreciation rate and pin down the value of δ, the only technology parameter that we do
not formally estimate. To avoid measurement problems due to chain weighting in the
earlier periods our sample starts in the ﬁrst quarter of 1954 and ends in the last quarter
of 2000. Since models of ﬁnancing frictions are usually applied to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms we ﬁrst
construct series on investment, capital and proﬁts of the Non-Financial Corporate Sector.
For comparison purposes, we also report results for the aggregate economy. Investment data
are quarterly averages, while asset returns are from the beginning to the end of the quarter.
As a correction, we follow Cochrane (1996) and average monthly asset returns over the
quarter and then shift them so they go from approximately the middle of the initial quarter
to the middle of the next quarter.26
In order to implement the estimation procedure, we require a suﬃcient number of moment
conditions. As described above, we limit ourselves to examining the model’s implications
for aggregate investment and bond returns. This means that we need to look at more than
just the aggregate stock return. Thus, we focus on the ten size portfolios of NYSE stock
returns. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these asset returns. In addition, we also
provide results for the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolio. Bond
data comes from Ibbotson’s index of Long Term Corporate Bonds. The default premium
26See also Lamont (2001) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) for a discussion of the important consequences
of aligning investment and asset returns.
21Table 1 : Summary Statistics of the Assets Returns in GMM
Decile Returns vwret Rf RB
123456789 1 0 m e a n
mean 11.80 9.49 9.03 9.07 8.50 8.57 7.67 8.16 7.34 6.64 7.10 1.86 0.72
std 19.61 17.49 16.73 16.16 15.49 15.19 14.51 13.80 12.90 11.35 11.87 1.32 7.11
Sharpe 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.00 0.10
ρ(1) 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.67 0.30
This table reports the means, volatilities, Sharpe ratios, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of excess returns of
deciles 1–10, excess value-weighted market return (vwret), real t-bill rate (Rf), and excess corporate bond
return (RB). These returns are used in GMM estimation and tests. The sample period is from 1954:2Q to
2000:3Q. Means and volatilities are in annualized percent.
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yields on BAA and AAA corporate bonds, both
obtained from DRI. As an alternative we also use the spread between BAA and long term
government bonds yields.
Conditioning information comes from two sources: the term premium, deﬁned as the yield
on ten year notes minus that on three-month Treasury Bills, and the dividend-price ratio of
the equally weighted NYSE portfolio. We follow Cochrane (1996) and limit the number of
moment conditions and scaled factors in three ways: (i) we do not scale the Treasury-Bill
return by the instruments since we are more interested in the time-variation of risk premium
than that of risk-free rate. (ii) Instruments themselves are not included as factors. (iii) We
use only deciles one, three, eight, and ten in the conditional estimates.
4 Results
4.1 GMM Estimates
It seems natural to expect that the ﬁnancing premium shows a positive correlation with the
observed default premium, or the ﬁnancing premium is countercyclical, since it may be more
expensive for ﬁrms to issue debt and equity in recessions. This suggests that we can expect
22b1 ≥ 0. We will refer to this as the “restricted” version of the model, as opposed to the
“unrestricted” version.
Table 2 reports iterated GMM estimates and tests for both the unrestricted and restricted
(b1 ≥ 0) versions of the benchmark models, unconditional, conditional, and scaled factor. In
all cases, we use the default premium, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yields on BAA
and AAA corporate bonds, as our common factor in the ﬁnancing premium equation (21).
As we discussed above, to circumvent the diﬃculties in the identifying b0 we ﬁx its value
so that the share of ﬁnancing costs in investment is always 3%. Table 3 however, conﬁrms
that our results are almost unchanged for a wide range of values for this parameter.27 In
all cases we report the value of the parameters a and b1 as well as the estimated loadings l
and corresponding t-statistics. Also included are the results of J tests on the model’s overall
ability to match the data, and the corresponding p-values.
Overall, our model is very successfull in pricing the cross-section of returns. In spite
of the inclusion of the last few years of stock market data, the model cannot be rejected
using the overidentifying restriction tests, JT. The root mean squared errors (RMSE, mean
return less predicted mean return) are all low — suggesting the statistical signiﬁcance of the
J tests is not due to an excessively large covariance matrix.28 Figure 1 conﬁrms this good
ﬁt by showing the close alignment between actual and predicted mean excess returns from
ﬁrst stage estimation. In addition, the hypothesis that all factor loadings are zero is almost
always rejected at the standard 5% signiﬁcance level. Finally, the estimated loadings on
corporate bond returns are usually statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting a relatively minor
role in pricing ﬁnancial assets. Hence, our results are mainly driven by the properties of
investment returns, RI.
27First-stage estimates are also very similar, particularly those concerning the role of ﬁnancing costs.
28RMSE are reduced by half if we truncate our sample in 1997.
23Table 2 : GMM Estimates and Tests in the Benchmark Case
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 7.04 ( 1.38) 6.34 ( 1.24) 1.49 ( 1.24) 8.61 ( 3.30) 7.70 ( 1.73)
b -0.05 (-1.33) -0.19 (-3.26) -0.17 (-2.57) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loadings
l0 150.64 ( 1.97) 45.46 ( 4.83) 47.91 ( 3.21) 181.89 ( 2.59) 70.51 ( 2.79) 73.54 ( 1.38)
l1 -150.33 (-2.00) -42.76 (-3.98) -59.21 (-3.23) -178.33 (-2.59) -71.09 (-2.81) -85.03 (-1.49)
l2 -3.27 (-1.06) -1.00 (-0.25) 13.40 ( 1.18) 0.43 ( 0.12) 2.71 ( 0.70) 14.15 ( 1.74)
l3 4.56 ( 1.68) 6.27 ( 2.26)
l4 3.11 ( 1.09) 4.58 ( 1.22)
l5 -4.84 (-1.69) -6.36 (-2.33)
l6 -3.02 (-1.01) -4.91 (-1.23)
JT Test
χ2 6.07 8.19 6.54 10.43 17.93 11.33
p 0.53 0.70 0.48 0.17 0.08 0.12
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.33 11.30 5.73
p 0.04 0.00 0.02
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted versions of the benchmark
model with linear ﬁnancing cost function. In the unrestricted model, b(St)=b0+b1×dt, where b1 is allowed
to be negative and dt is the default premium, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yields on Baa and Aaa
corporate bonds. In the restricted model, b(St)=b0+b1×dt, where b1 is restricted to be nonnegative.
In both cases, b0 is chosen such that the implied share of ﬁnancing cost in investment expenditure is
3%. We report the estimates for a, b1, and the loadings l’s in the pricing kernel, the χ2 statistic and
corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on
the null hypothesis that b1=0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates.
GMM estimates and tests are conducted for the unconditional, unscaled and scaled conditional model. The
unconditional model uses as moment conditions the excess returns of 10 CRSP size decile portfolio and
one excess investment return (over corporate bond return) and the corporate bond return (12 moment
conditions). The unscaled and scaled conditional models use the excess returns of size deciles 1, 3, 8, 10,
and excess investment returns (over corporate bond return), scaled by instruments, and the corporate bond
return (16 moment conditions). Instruments are the constant, term premium (tp), and equally weighted
dividend-price ratio (dp). The pricing kernel is M =l0 + l1RI + l2RB for the unconditional and conditional
models where RI is real investment return and RB is real corporate bond return. The pricing kernel is:
M =l0+l1RI +l2RB +l3(RI·tp)+l4(RI·dp)+l5(RB·tp)+l6(RB·dp) for the scaled factor model. Investment
return series are constructed from the ﬂow-of-fund accounts using nonﬁnancial proﬁts before tax.
24Table 3 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Varying Levels of Financing Cost
Panel A: Low Share 1%
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 7.03 ( 1.38) 6.37 ( 1.25) 1.51 ( 1.25) 8.61 ( 3.30) 7.75 ( 1.73)
b -0.05 (-1.33) -0.18 (-3.26) -0.16 (-2.58) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 6.07 8.19 6.52 10.51 17.94 11.38
p 0.53 0.70 0.48 0.16 0.08 0.12
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.33 11.29 5.74
p 0.04 0.00 0.02
Panel B: High Share 10%
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 7.04 ( 1.37) 6.33 ( 1.24) 1.50 ( 1.25) 8.61 ( 3.30) 7.75 ( 1.74)
b -0.06 (-1.32) -0.22 (-3.26) -0.19 (-2.57) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 6.08 8.20 6.54 10.46 17.93 11.37
p 0.53 0.70 0.48 0.16 0.08 0.12
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.33 11.31 5.73
p 0.04 0.00 0.02
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with varying
levels of ﬁnancing cost. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where b0 is chosen such that
the implied shared of ﬁnancing cost in investment expenditure is 3%, Panel A reports the GMM estimates
and tests for the Low Share case where b0 is chosen such that the implied share of ﬁnancing cost in investment
is only 1%. Panel B does the same for the High Share case where the implied share of ﬁnancing cost in
investment is 10%. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for
the JT test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that
b1 =0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernel and
the set of moment conditions are the same as in the benchmark case reported in Table 2.
25Figure 1 : Predicted Versus Actual Mean Excess Returns
This ﬁgure plots the mean excess returns against predicted mean excess return, both of which are in % per
quarter, for conditional model (Panel A), conditional model (Panel B), and scaled factor model (Panel C).
All plots are from ﬁrst-stage GMM estimates.
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates













































Panel B: Conditional Estimates Panel C: Scaled Factor






















































































26Although our model uses only a single aggregate investment return as a pricing factor (in
addition to the bond returns) these results are generally comparable to Cochrane’s (1996)
ﬁndings. The reason for this empirical success is that our construction of investment returns,
RI, uses independent information on variations in the marginal productivity of capital, πt,
and investment, it. Cochrane (1996), on the other hand, abstracts from the variation in
the marginal productivity of capital in constructing investment returns and uses instead
two separate investment series (residential and non-residential) to construct two investment
returns.29
4.2 The Eﬀect of Financing Constraints
The focus of our analysis, however, is the role of the ﬁnancing cost parameters. Table 2
shows that the unrestricted estimate yields a negative value for b1 which implies that the
ﬁnancing premium must have a negative correlation with the default premium. If we restrict
the choices to be nonnegative as in the restricted model, then we always obtain that b1 is
exactly zero! As we have argued above, even if b1 is not zero, it is not possible to identify
the actual level of the ﬁnancing premium.
Depending upon whether one ﬁnds the non-negativity constraint on b1 plausible, we can
oﬀer two possible interpretations for the above ﬁndings. Clearly, if one believes that the
ﬁnancing premium should be closely related to the default premium (b1 ≥ 0), then the
simplest explanation of our ﬁndings seems to be that ﬁnancing factors are not very useful
in explaining the cross-section of expected returns. On the other hand, if ﬁnancing factors
are an important component of expected returns, then the ﬁnancing premium must behave
very diﬀerently from the observed default premium.
29Economically, our estimates for a also seem sensible, implying adjustment costs around 8-9% of total
investment spending.
274.2.1 The Role of Financing Premium
To understand the role of the ﬁnancing premium it is useful to return to our decomposition
of investment returns in (20). Figure 2 displays the correlation structure between the growth
rate in the default premium dt+1/dt, stock returns, RS
t+1, and investment returns RI
t+1 for
diﬀerent levels of b1, with leads and lags of the two fundamentals, it (Panel A) and πt (Panel
B).
In both panels, the pattern of ˆ RI (when b1 = 0) is very similar to the observed RS.
Both returns lead future economic activity, while their contemporaneous correlation with
fundamentals is somewhat low. As Cochrane (1991) notes, this is to be expected if ﬁrms
adjust current investment in response to an anticipated rise in future productivity. The
behavior of the default premium, however, is quite diﬀerent. Its negative correlation with
future economic activity implies a series of investment returns that behaves quite unlike
observed stock returns, thus making RI
t+1 with a positive (negative) b1 less (more) useful as
a pricing factor.
The intuition is as follows. Since a rise in expected future productivity (or proﬁts) is
associated with an expected decline in the ﬁnancing premia (because of its counter-cyclical
properties), there is an incentive for the ﬁrm to delay its investment response in the presence
of ﬁnancing constraints. From equation (19) we learn that this lowers investment returns.
As Figure 2 shows, this makes it more diﬃcult for investment returns to match the observed
pattern of stock returns.
To summarize, productivity and ﬁnancing costs provide two competing forces that
determine the reaction of investment, and hence investment returns, to business cycle
conditions. On the one hand, productivity implies that ﬁrms should respond by investing
immediately. On the other hand, since the future entails lower ﬁnancing costs, ﬁrms should
28Figure 2 : Correlation Structure
This ﬁgure presents the correlations of investment returns RI, real value-weighted market return RS,t h e
growth rate of default premium dt+1/dt with I/K and Π/K with various leads and lags. Panel A plots the
correlation structure of the above series with I/K and Panel B plots that with Π/K. In the graphs, b is the
slope term in the speciﬁcation of ﬁnancing premium (21), and the intercept term is set such that the implied
share of ﬁnancing cost in investment is 3%.
Panel A: Correlation With Π/K











































Panel B: Correlation With I/K








































29delay investment. Figure 2 shows that consistency with asset return data requires the
ﬁnancing channel to be unimportant, unless the ﬁnancing premium is procyclical, i.e., b1<0.
Figure 2 also suggests that these results are not likely to rely on timing issues such as
those created by the existence of time-to-plan (or perhaps time-to-ﬁnance in this context).30
The reason is that there is no obvious phase shift between the premium and the return
series. What seems crucial is the countercyclical pattern of the premium on external ﬁnance,
induced by the behavior of the default premium. This is why we obtain a negative value for
b1 in the unrestricted version of our model.
4.2.2 Properties of the Pricing Kernel
Table 4 provides additional intuition for our results by examining the eﬀect of ﬁnancing
frictions on the pricing kernel and the pricing errors. It describes the eﬀects of increasing
the value of b1 above 0 in each set of moment conditions, while a is kept constant at its
optimal level reported Table 2.
As we can readily observe, a countercyclical ﬁnancing premium lowers the market price of
risk σ(M)/E(M), as well as the (absolute) correlation between the pricing kernel and value-
weighted returns for all three models, thus deteriorating the performance of the pricing
kernel. Perhaps more direct evidence is given by examining the implied pricing errors. A
simple way of doing this is to compute the beta representation:
Ri − Rf =αi + β1i(R
I − Rf)+β2i(R
B − Rf)
Given the assumed structure of the pricing kernel this representation exists, with αi =0
(see the discussion in Cochrane, 2001). Therefore, large values of α are evidence against the
model. Table 4 reports the implied αs for the regressions on both small ﬁrms (NYSE decile
30This issue is analyzed by Lamont (2000) in an asset pricing context.
30Table 4 : Properties of Pricing Kernels, Jensen’s α, and Investment Returns
Pricing Kernel Jensen’s α Investment Return
b
σ[M]
E[M] ρM,RS αvw tvw
α αd1 td1
α mean σRI ρ(1) ρRI,RS
Unconditional Model
0.00 0.82 -0.28 0.26 0.35 1.02 0.78 6.55 0.97 0.76 0.30
0.15 0.57 -0.03 3.03 4.94 5.69 5.45 6.56 1.70 0.38 -0.31
0.30 0.58 -0.07 3.07 6.22 5.58 6.66 6.58 2.98 0.31 -0.41
Conditional Model
0.00 0.75 -0.29 0.16 0.30 0.68 0.77 5.91 2.24 0.09 0.35
0.15 0.37 0.39 1.46 2.70 3.01 3.25 5.92 2.23 0.00 -0.01
0.30 0.79 0.17 2.22 4.51 4.21 5.02 5.93 3.05 0.10 -0.24
Scaled Factor Model
0.00 0.81 -0.36 0.03 0.06 0.51 0.55 6.02 1.99 0.14 0.36
0.25 0.67 -0.06 1.63 2.92 3.35 3.48 6.03 2.06 0.06 -0.05
0.50 0.61 0.01 2.38 4.79 4.48 5.30 6.04 2.98 0.15 -0.27
This table reports, for each combination of parameters a and b, properties of the pricing kernel, including
market price of risk (σ[M]/E[M]), the contemporaneous correlation between pricing kernel and real market
return (ρM,RS), Jensen’s α and its corresponding t-statistic (tα), summary statistics of investment return,
including mean, volatility (σRI), ﬁrst-order autocorrelation (ρ(1)), and correlation with the real value-
weighted market return (ρRI,RS). Jensen’s α is deﬁned from the following regression:
Rp − Rf = α + β1(RI − Rf)+β2(RB − Rf)
where Rp is either real value-weighted market return (Rvw) or real decile one return (R1), Rf is real interest
rate proxied by real treasury-bill rate, RI is investment return, and RB is real corporate bond return. In
each case the cost parameters a’s are held ﬁxed at the GMM estimates.
311) and value-weighted returns. It displays a clear pattern of increasing α as we increase the
magnitude of the ﬁnancing costs. Indeed, while we cannot reject that α =0w h e nb1 =0 ,
this hypothesis is rejected for most of the other parameter conﬁgurations.
We also report the implications of ﬁnancing costs for the raw moments of investment
returns and their correlation with market returns. While both the mean and the variance of
investment returns are not changed by much as b1 increases (at least initially), the correlation
with stock returns lowers signiﬁcantly. Since the overall performance of a factor model hinges
on its covariance structure with returns, it is not surprising that ﬁnancing costs are not
important for the construction of the pricing kernel as documented in Table 2.31
5 Robustness
This section examines the robustness of our results by exploring several alternatives to
our benchmark approach. Speciﬁcally we study the eﬀects of using alternative moment
conditions, consider several alternative measures of the ﬁnancing premium, non-linear pricing
kernels and, ﬁnally, look at alternative macroeconomic data.
5.1 Alternative Sets of Moment Conditions
Many authors interpret the cross-sectional variation in the Fama and French (1993) size
and book-to-market portfolio returns as proxies for ﬁnancial distress. Panel A in Table
5 investigate this possibility by using our model to price the 25 Fama and French (1993)
portfolio returns. Speciﬁcally, the unconditional model uses the excess returns of portfolios
11, 13, 15, 23, 31, 33, 35, 43, 51, 53, 55 of the Fama and French (1993) 25 portfolios, one
investment excess return (over real corporate bond return), and real corporate bond return
31An alternative way of representing the impact of ﬁnancing constraints is to compare their eﬀect on the
pricing kernels with the Hansen-Jagannathan (1991) bounds. Here, increasing b1 has the eﬀect of moving
the estimated kernels farther way from the bounds.
32(13 moment conditions).32 The conditional and scaled model use excess returns of Fama-
French portfolio 11, 15, 51, and 55, scaled by instruments, excess investment return (over
corporate bond return) and the real corporate bond return (16 moment conditions). The
results show that, even here however, the estimated value of b1 is again either negative or
zero.
In addition, several studies on ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints emphasize that they are more
likely to be detected when looking only at the behavior of small ﬁrms. An easy way to
assess the model’s implications for diﬀerent ﬁrms is to test the moment conditions (23) for
portfolios of small ﬁrms only. Panel B of Table 5 reports GMM estimates and tests using
small ﬁrm portfolios in the moment conditions. Speciﬁcally, the unconditional model uses
the excess returns of 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the Fama and French 25
portfolios, one investment excess return (over real corporate bond return), and real corporate
bond return (12 moment conditions). The conditional and scaled model use excess returns of
Fama-French portfolios 11, 12, 13, and 15, scaled by instruments, excess investment return
(over corporate bond return) and the real corporate bond return (16 moment conditions).
Nevertheless, our basic conclusions also seem to hold for this subset of ﬁrms.
5.2 Alternative Measure of the Financing Premium
As we have argued above in Section 4.2, our results are not sensitive to the speciﬁc measure
of the ﬁnancing premium, as long as it has the same countercyclical property of the default
premium. Table 6 conﬁrms our results by using an alternative measure of the default
premium — the spread between the yields on Baa bonds and those on ten year government
notes.
32Following popular convention, the ﬁrst digit denotes the size group and the second digit denotes the
book-to-market group, both of which are in ascending order. Thus, portfolio 15 is formed by the intersection
of smallest size and highest book-to-market ratio.
33Table 5 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative Moment Conditions
Panel A: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 1.35 (0.10) 0.00 13.79 (1.87) 34.40 (2.86) 22.23 (2.37)
b -0.13 (-1.82) -0.26 (-2.23) -0.22 (-1.62) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 33.57 25.47 16.10 48.09 24.83 12.93
p 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.41 13.60 3.95
p 0.04 0.00 0.05
Panel B: Small Firm Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 1.26 (0.55) 14.40 (1.80) 2.21 (0.41) 3.14 (1.18) 37.52 (2.45) 2.56 (0.74)
b -0.05 (-1.24) -0.18 (-2.42) -0.11 (-0.58) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 32.73 20.17 9.99 35.22 18.08 9.89
p 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.08 0.19
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 2.19 6.60 2.20
p 0.14 0.01 0.14
Panel A reports GMM estimates and tests using Fama-French 25 portfolios in the moment conditions.
Speciﬁcally, the unconditional model uses the excess returns of portfolios 11, 13, 15, 23, 31, 33, 35, 43, 51,
53, 55 of the Fama and French (1993) 25 portfolios, one investment excess return (over real corporate bond
return), and real corporate bond return (13 moment conditions). The Fama-French portfolios are numbered
such that the ﬁrst digit denotes the size group and the second digit denotes the book-to-market group, both of
which are in ascending order. The conditional and scaled model use excess returns of Fama-French portfolio
11, 15, 51, and 55, scaled by instruments, excess investment return and the real corporate bond return (16
moment conditions). Panel B reports GMM estimates and tests using small ﬁrm portfolios. Speciﬁcally, the
unconditional model uses the excess returns of 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the Fama and
French 25 portfolios, one investment excess return, and real corporate bond return (12 moment conditions).
The conditional and scaled model use excess returns of Fama-French portfolios 11, 12, 13, and 15, scaled by
instruments, excess investment return and the real corporate bond return (16 moment conditions). We report
the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-identiﬁcation,
and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1=0. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same as in the benchmark case
reported in Table 2.
34Table 6 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative Default Premium Measured
As Yield Spread Between Baa and Ten-year Treasury Bond
Panel A: Size Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 7.48 (1.74) 4.61 (0.81) 1.44 (1.03) 8.71 (3.03) 6.33 (1.63)
b -0.03 (-0.83) -0.10 (-2.26) -0.10 (-1.85) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 7.69 11.63 6.85 10.54 18.12 10.50
p 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.16 0.08 0.16
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 3.55 8.88 6.01
p 0.06 0.00 0.01
Panel B: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 3.35 (0.17) 0.00 13.53 (1.96) 34.81 (3.43) 22.21 (2.49)
b -0.09 (-1.74) -0.22 (-2.09) -0.17 (-1.07) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 28.77 21.60 8.53 47.52 24.72 13.28
p 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.07
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 5.63 10.52 2.89
p 0.02 0.00 0.09
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
measure of external ﬁnancing premium. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where default
premium dt is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between yields of Baa and Aaa bonds, here dt is the diﬀerence
between yields of Baa and long-term government bonds. Panel A reports GMM estimates and tests using
10 CRSP size deciles in the moment conditions as in the benchmark Table tb:gmmBench. Panel B reports
GMM estimates and tests using Fama-French portfolios in the moment conditions as in Panel A of Table
5. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-
identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1 =0. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same as in the
benchmark case reported in Table 2.
35As discussed above, the ﬁnancing premium can also be represented as an increasing
function of the external-ﬁnance-to-capital ratio, X/K. This representation has the advantage
of generality, since it holds regardless of the exact form of external ﬁnance used. Accordingly,
Table 7 shows the results of using X/K as the common factor in the ﬁnancing premium. The
results conﬁrm the robustness of our ﬁndings under this more general representation. Table 8
then combines both the default premium and the amount of external ﬁnance by representing
the ﬁnancing premium as b(St)(Xt/Kt). Although this ad-hoc representation is not formally
justiﬁed, it does allow for the possibility of measurement error in either measure. Again
however, Table 8 conﬁrms that this modiﬁcation has a only negligible impact on our results.
Finally, we also look at two more elaborate measures of ﬁnancing constraints. One is
the aggregate default likelihood measure constructed in Vassalou and Xing (2002). The
other one is the common factor of ﬁnancing constraints constructed in Lamont, Polk, and
Saa-Requejo (2001).
Vassalou and Xing (2002) use ﬁrm-level equity data to estimate default likelihood
indicators for individual ﬁrms following the contingent claims methodology of Merton (1974).
These indicators are nonlinear functions of the default probabilities of the ﬁrms. The
aggregate default likelihood measure is then deﬁned as a simple average of the default
likelihood indicators of all ﬁrms. Vassalou and Xing (2002) show that this aggregate default
measure varies greatly with the business cycle and increases substantially during recessions.33
Tables 9 reports our GMM results for this case. As before, we ﬁnd that b1 is mostly negative
in the unrestricted model and mostly zero in the restricted model. This is not surprising,
since the aggregate default measure is also quite countercyclical.
33We thank Maria Vassalou for providing us with the series of aggregate default measure. This default
measure is monthly and goes from January 1971 to December of 1999. We construct the corresponding
quarterly measure by averaging the likelihoods of the three months within a given quarter.
36Table 7 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative External Finance Premium
Measured As a Linear Function of External-Finance-Capital Ratio
Panel A: Size Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.26 (0.33) 0.77 (0.56) 0.00 0.00 2.90 (1.00) 25.00 (0.26)
b -0.66 (-1.26) -0.70 (-3.06) -2.81 (-1.75) 0.00 0.00 0.25 (0.03)
JT Test
χ2 21.37 34.64 2.09 43.69 41.75 8.44
p 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.30
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 1.54 16.25 12.89 0.03
p 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.87
Panel B: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 3.47 (1.84) 53.15 (2.59) 3.21 (0.81) 3.47 (1.84) 46.51 (2.75) 2.01 (0.80)
b 0.25 (0.36) -0.59 (-0.11) -0.86 (-0.42) 0.25 (0.36) 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 36.87 29.06 8.97 36.87 29.64 9.41
p 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.22
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 1.77 0.03 0.11 1.77
p 0.18 0.87 0.75 0.18
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
measure of external ﬁnancing premium. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where external
ﬁnancing premium is assumed to be b0+b1dt and where the default premium, dt, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between yields of Baa and Aaa bonds, here the external ﬁnancing premium is assumed to be b0 +b1(Xt/Kt)
where Xt denotes the amount of external ﬁnance. Panel A reports GMM estimates and tests using 10 CRSP
size deciles in the moment conditions as in the benchmark Table 2. Panel B reports GMM estimates and tests
using Fama-French portfolios in the moment conditions as in Panel A of Table 5. We report the estimates
for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic
and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1 =0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses to
the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same as in the benchmark case reported in
Table 2.
37Table 8 : GMM Estimates and Tests using both the Default Premium and the
E x t e r n a lF i n a n c et oS i z eR a t i o
Panel A: Size Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 8.00 (1.58) 7.75 (1.57) 3.55 (1.74) 12.44 (3.79) 9.04 (1.68)
b -0.23 (-2.04) -0.34 (-2.44) -0.25 (-1.10) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 5.16 11.50 7.25 11.82 18.03 9.82
p 0.64 0.40 0.40 0.11 0.08 0.2
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 3.61 9.23 4.12
p 0.06 0.00 0.04
Panel B: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 17.11 (1.15) 14.42 (1.35) 19.18 (1.95) 36.33 (2.70) 25.10 (2.68)
b -0.30 (-2.62) -0.43 (-1.23) -0.31 (-1.02) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 27.00 22.01 15.34 52.08 25.68 12.61
p 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.35 7.27 1.97
p 0.04 0.01 0.16
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with a ﬁnancing
premium equal to b(St)Xt/Kt where Kt denotes the capital stock. Panel A reports GMM estimates and
tests using 10 CRSP size deciles in the moment conditions as in the benchmark Table 2. Panel B reports
GMM estimates and tests using Fama-French portfolios in the moment conditions as in Panel A of Table
5. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-
identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1 =0. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same as in the
benchmark case reported in Table 2.
38The common factor of ﬁnancial constraints constructed in Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo
(2001) is the return spread between more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and less constrained
ﬁrms, where the degree of being constrained is quantiﬁed using the methodology of Kaplan
and Zingales (1997). This factor is also more related to external equity-ﬁnancing premium,
since it is constructed using data on equity returns.34 Table 10 also conﬁrms our earlier
intuition. In this case most of the estimates of b1 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Again, this is not surprising since the common factor of ﬁnancing constraint does not seem
to covary with credit conditions or business cycles, as documented in Lamont, Polk, and
Saa-Requejo (2001).
5.3 Alternative Macroeconomic Series
Table 11 shows the eﬀects of using alternative data in the construction of the investment
returns. Panel A reports the results of using after tax proﬁts in the construction of investment
returns, while Panel B reports similar results when the overall macroeconomic aggregate
proﬁt series is used. In either case it is easy to see that our results are very similar to those
in Table 2.
5.4 Non-Linear Pricing Kernels
The use of a linear factor representation may be restrictive, and several alternative
approaches modelling nonlinear pricing kernels have been recently advanced in the
literature.35 We explore this possibility by re-estimating the moment conditions using several
nonlinear pricing kernels. Here, we consider examples where the pricing kernel is quadratic
in either RI alone or in both RI and RB. As Table 12 shows, none of these cases changes
34We thank Christopher Polk for providing us with the series of ﬁnancing constraint common factor. The
series is monthly and goes from July of 1968 to December of 1997. We construct the corresponding quarterly
factor by time aggregation.
35E.g., Bansal and Vishwanathan (1993), Chapman (1997), and Brandt and Yaron (2001).
39Table 9 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative External Finance Premium
Measured As a Linear Function of Aggregate Default Measure
Panel A: Size Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 4.59 (0.65) 1.50 (1.00) 1.17 (0.34) 20.00 (0.49) 3.79 (1.16) 0.00
b1 -0.02 (-1.78) -0.02 (-5.48) -0.02 (-1.96) 0.00 0.00 0.02 (4.21)
JT Test
χ2 4.32 26.10 5.72 13.80 62.65 10.32
p 0.74 0.01 0.57 0.05 0.00 0.17
Wald Test (b1=0)
χ2
(1) 2.24 35.07 1.27 13.45
p 0.13 0.00 0.26 0.00
Panel B: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 35.70 (1.14) 20.00 (0.55) 4.89 (0.72) 35.70 (1.14) 20.00 (0.55) 6.29 (0.68)
b1 0.00 0.06 (0.95) -0.01 (-0.32) 0.00 0.06 (0.95) 0.00
JT Test
χ2 13.70 43.82 11.14 47.52 43.82 11.94
p 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.10
Wald Test (b1=0)
χ2
(1) 2.77 0.17 2.77
p 0.10 0.68 0.10
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
measure of external ﬁnancing premium. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where external
ﬁnancing premium is a liner function of default premium, here it is a linear function of the aggregate default
likelihood indicator constructed in Vassalou and Xing (2002). Panel A reports GMM estimates and tests using
10 CRSP size deciles in the moment conditions as in the benchmark Table 2. Panel B reports GMM estimates
and tests using Fama-French portfolios in the moment conditions as in Panel A of Table 5. We report the
estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-identiﬁcation, and
χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1 =0 . t-statistics are reported in
parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same as in the benchmark case
reported in Table 2.
40Table 10 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative External Finance Premium
Measured As a Linear Function of the Common Factor of Financing Constraints
Panel A: Size Deciles
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 (0.30) 4.86 (1.16) 0.00
b1 -0.59 (-0.77) -0.29 (-2.69) 0.21 (1.80) 0.60 (0.55) 0.00 0.21 (1.79)
JT Test
χ2 61.06 26.18 5.35 21.18 74.92 5.29
p 0.00 0.01 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.62
Wald Test (b1=0)
χ2
(1) 1.05 23.44 2.77 0.05 2.77
p 0.31 0.00 0.10 0.83 0.10
Panel B: Fama-French Portfolios
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 21.65 (0.76) 3.67 (0.87) 12.20 (0.89) 21.64 (0.76) 3.66 (0.87) 12.20 (0.89)
b1 0.68 (1.23) 0.00 0.06 (0.34) 0.68 (1.23) 0.00 0.06 (0.34)
JT Test
χ2 16.16 91.63 6.11 16.16 91.63 6.11
p 0.02 0.00 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.53
Wald Test (b1=0)
χ2
(1) 2.44 0.16 2.44 0.16
p 0.12 0.67 0.12 0.67
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
measure of external ﬁnancing premium. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where external
ﬁnancing premium is a liner function of default premium, here it is a linear function of the common factor
of ﬁnancing constraints constructed by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Panel A reports GMM
estimates and tests using 10 CRSP size deciles in the moment conditions as in the benchmark Table 2. Panel
B reports GMM estimates and tests using Fama-French portfolios in the moment conditions as in Panel A
of Table 5. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT
test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1=0.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The pricing kernels are the same
as in the benchmark case reported in Table 2.
41Table 11 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Alternative Measures of Proﬁts
Panel A: Nonﬁnancial After Tax
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.79 ( 0.65) 4.17 (0.84) 2.77 (0.62) 2.06 (1.92) 5.81 (2.49) 1.65 (0.87)
b -0.04 (-1.20) -0.17 (-3.84) -0.12 (-2.21) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 4.70 8.78 5.93 5.99 25.71 8.74
p 0.70 0.64 0.55 0.54 0.01 0.27
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 2.42 12.60 6.38
p 0.12 0.00 0.01
Panel B: Aggregate Proﬁts
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 0.00 5.14 (0.45) 7.76 (1.23) 16.83 (0.57) 13.35 (2.89) 12.38 (1.67)
b -0.14 (-0.96) -0.20 (-3.18) -0.12 (-2.46) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 11.12 12.00 13.41 15.18 25.67 12.37
p 0.13 0.36 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.09
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 4.88 11.63 5.48
p 0.03 0.00 0.02
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
measures of proﬁts. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where investment return series
are constructed using nonﬁnancial proﬁts before tax, Panel A reports GMM estimates and tests in which
investment return series are constructed using nonﬁnancial proﬁts after tax and Panel B does the same using
aggregate (both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial) proﬁts. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and
corresponding p-value for the JT test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on
the null hypothesis that b1=0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates.
The pricing kernel and the set of moment conditions are the same as in the benchmark case reported in
Table 2.
42Table 12 : GMM Estimates and Tests with Nonlinear Pricing Kernels
Panel A: M =l0 + l1RI + l2(RI)2
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 1.00 ( 0.15) 6.16 (1.82) 4.90 (1.11) 1.58 (1.25) 12.17 (4.30) 10.25 (2.16)
b -0.26 (-3.79) -0.19 (-3.67) -0.18 (-3.31) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 11.64 8.33 4.21 10.56 17.52 10.00
p 0.11 0.68 0.76 0.16 0.09 0.19
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 1.36 16.72 12.28
p 0.24 0.00 0.00
Panel B: M =l0 + l1RI + l2RB + l3(RI)2 + l4(RB)2
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor Unconditional Conditional Scaled Factor
Parameters
a 1.49 (1.48) 8.29 (1.25) 3.72 (0.68) 2.24 (1.97) 9.64 (3.14) 19.87 (0.20)
b -0.03 (-1.66) -0.20 (-3.34) -0.08 (-0.80) 0.00 0.00 0.00
JT Test
χ2 1.33 6.56 1.43 4.91 21.52 3.98
p 0.93 0.68 0.15 0.43 0.01 0.09
Wald Test (b=0)
χ2
(1) 2.35 8.40 4.94
p 0.13 0.00 0.03
This table reports GMM estimates and tests of both the unrestricted and restricted models with alternative
speciﬁcations of the pricing kernel. In contrast to the benchmark case reported in Table 2 where investment
return series are constructed using nonﬁnancial proﬁts before tax, Panel A reports GMM estimates and
tests in which the pricing kernel is: M = l0 + l1RI + l2(RI)2 where RI denotes investment return for the
unconditional and conditional model and is: M =l0 +l1RI +l2(RI)2 +l3(RI·tp)+l4(RI·dp)+l5((RI)2·tp)+
l6((RI)2·dp) for the scaled factor model. Panel B reports GMM estimates and tests in which the pricing
kernel is: M =l0 + l1RI + l2RB + l3(RI)2 + l4(RB)2 where RB denotes real corporate bond return for the
unconditional and conditional model and is: M =l0 + l1RI + l2RB + l3(RI)2 + l4(RB)2 + l5(RI·tp)+l6(RI·
dp)+l7(RB·tp)+l8(RB·dp)+l9((RI)2·tp)+l10((RI)2·dp)+l11((RB)2·tp)+l12((RB)2·dp) for the scaled
factor model. We report the estimates for a and b1,t h eχ2 statistic and corresponding p-value for the JT
test on over-identiﬁcation, and χ2 statistic and p-value of the Wald test on the null hypothesis that b1=0.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right of parameter estimates. The set of moment conditions
are the same as in the benchmark case reported in Table 2. The investment return series is constructed from
ﬂows of funds accounts using nonﬁnancial proﬁts before tax.
43our original ﬁndings.
6 Conclusion
Despite its empirical success, the investment-based asset pricing model (Cochrane (1991,
1996)) has been, until recently, relatively neglected by researchers, in favor of either
standard consumption-based or APT-like asset pricing models. This is unfortunate since,
by concentrating on optimal ﬁrm behavior, this approach holds the promise of endogenously
linking ﬁrm characteristics with asset returns. Moreover, it also provides a natural way
of integrating new developments in the theory of corporate ﬁnance into an asset pricing
framework.
In this paper we pursue this line of research by incorporating costly external ﬁnance in
an investment-based asset pricing model and ask whether ﬁnancing frictions help in pricing
the cross-section of expected returns. To avoid specifying the underlying source of these
frictions we show that the typical assumptions about the nature of the ﬁnancing frictions
are captured by a simple “ﬁnancing cost” function, which provides a tractable framework to
examine the role of ﬁnancing frictions in pricing asset returns.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the role played by ﬁnancing frictions, in terms of
explaining the cross-section of expected return is fairly negligible. This ﬁnding is robust
to several alternative formulations of our model, particularly the measures of the ﬁnancing
premium, the speciﬁc macroeconomic data used, and the set of returns used in our GMM
implementations. We show that our results hold unless the premium on external funds is
procyclical, a property not evident in the data and not satisﬁed by most models of costly
external ﬁnance.
These ﬁndings question whether ﬁnancing frictions are important for explaining the cross-
44section of expected returns. Moreover, our results also cast doubt on whether ﬁnancing
constraints provide a realistic propagation mechanism in several macroeconomic models.
Strictly speaking however, our methodology applies only to models of costly external
ﬁnance. Thus, it is also possible to interpret these ﬁndings as providing evidence against
the popular models of costly external ﬁnance, perhaps in favor of alternative views on the
nature ﬁnancing frictions.
A few aspects of our empirical implementation suggest promising directions for future
research. First, investment may have an important time-to-build component, and ﬁnancing
procedures may precede the actual investment spending by a quarter or more, leading ﬁrms
to look at lagged measures of fundamentals when making their decisions. Although our
results suggest that this explanation is unlikely to account for the rejection of ﬁnancing
frictions, only an explicit examination of the potential implications of time aggregation can
fully address this issue. Second, although ﬁnancing constraints seem to play no role in
determining the systematic component of expected returns in this paper, they may still be
fairly important to explain the idiosyncratic component of ex-post ﬁrm level returns. Since
our model has implications for ex-post returns it can also be used to investigate this issue
by looking directly at ﬁrm level data as well.
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51A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by letting









as the expected monitoring costs to the lender.
Then the optimal contract gives rise to optimal ﬁrst order conditions
ψ (A) − λ[ψ (A) − Υ (A) ]=0
(1 − ψ(A)) + λ[ψ(A) − Υ(A)] − Rf =0
[ψ(A) − Υ(A)]K = Rf(K − F)=RfB
which can be solved recursively to obtain a set of functions λ(A), A(Rf) and ﬁnally b = B/K =
η(Rf,A).
Since optimal default implies that R = A/b, it is immediate that




























To prove Proposition 2 we need to establish the following Lemma ﬁrst.































Now homogeneity of the value function implies that







































































R(Bt/Kt)Bt + C1(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt > 0


















G(Kt,K t+1,S t)=(µt − 1)Bt+1 (A4)
it follows that





G2(Kt,K t+1,S t)=−(µt − 1)C2(Kt,K t+1,S t) (A6)
Integration of (A6) yields
G(Kt,K t+1,S t)=

G2(Kt,K t+1,S t)dKt+1 = −(µt − 1)C(Kt,K t+1,S t)+f1(Kt,S t)
where f1(·) is independent of Kt+1. Using Lemma 1 we know that the integral of (A5) equals




where f2(·) is independent of Kt. Combining two equations above yields
G(Kt,K t+1,S t)=( µt − 1)

R(Bt/Kt)Bt + D − C(Kt,K t+1,S t)


=( µt − 1)Bt+1




C1(Kt+1,K t+2,S t+1) − G1(Kt+1,K t+2,S t+1)
−C2(Kt,K t+1,S t)+G2(Kt,K t+1,S t)
=
 C1(Kt+1,K t+2,S t+1)
− C2(Kt,K t+1,S t)
To prove Proposition 3 we need to establish the following Lemma ﬁrst.
Lemma 2 The value of the ﬁrm equals the sum of (cum-dividend) equity value and the value of
outstanding debt:
qtKt = V (Kt,B t,S t)+µtBt [R(Bt/Kt)+R1(Bt/Kt)(Bt/Kt)] (A7)
where qt = V1(Kt,B t,S t) denotes the marginal q. Moreover, (A7) implies that marginal q equals
Tobin’s (average) q.
Proof For simplicity consider the case where D =0 . Rewrite the value of the ﬁrm as




(1 − µt + λd
t)Dt +[ µt − W (Nt/Kt)+λn
t ]Nt + µt[C(Kt,K t+1,S t)
+Bt+1 − R(Bt/Kt)Bt]+E t [Mt,t+1V (Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)]

The complementarity-slackness conditions imply that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is zero
and the second equals W1 (Nt/Kt)(Nt/Kt)Nt.
Next, homogeneity of the value function and the envelope conditions imply that:
Et [Mt,t+1V (Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)] = −µtC2(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt+1 − µtBt+1
54while homogeneity of C yields
C1(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt = C(Kt,K t+1,S t) − C2(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt+1
Hence the value function collapses to
V (Kt,B t,S t)=W1 (Nt/Kt)(Nt/Kt)Nt + µt [C1(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt − R(Bt/Kt)Bt]
Rearranging, and using the envelope condition, we have:
V (Kt,B t,S t)+µt [R(Bt/Kt)Bt + R1(Bt/Kt)(Bt/Kt)Bt]=V1(Kt,B t,S t)Kt




V e(Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)+[ Dt+1 − W(Nt+1/Kt+1,S t+1)Nt+1]




e(Kt,B t,S t) ≡ V (Kt,B t,S t) − [Dt − W(Nt/Kt,S t)Nt] (A9)
is the (current period) value of the ﬁrm to shareholders after new issues take place and dividends
are paid.







µt [C1(Kt,K t+1,S t)Kt − C(Kt,K t+1,S t)]
(A10)
=
V (Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)+µt+1Bt+1 [R(Bt+1/Kt+1)+R1(Bt+1/Kt+1)(Bt+1/Kt+1)]
V (Kt,B t,S t) − µtDt + µtBt+1 + Nt [µt − W1 (Nt/Kt)(Nt/Kt)]
, (A11)
where the second equality follows from homogeneity of C(·), and the third from the envelope
condition and Lemma 2. Next, observe that the complementarity slackness conditions imply:
Dt(1 − µt)=0




V (Kt+1,B t+1,S t+1)+µt+1Bt+1 [R(Bt+1/Kt+1)+R1(Bt+1/Kt+1)(Bt+1/Kt+1)]
V (Kt,B t,S t) − Dt + µtBt+1 + W(Nt/Kt)Nt
Using the deﬁnitions of RS
t+1, RB
t+1 it follows that:
RI
t+1 =( 1− ωt)RS
t+1 + ωtRB
t+1
55where the leverage ratio, ωt, equals
ωt =
µtBt+1
V e(Kt,B t,S t)+µtBt+1
. (A12)

































Macroeconomic data comes from NIPA, published by the BEA, and the Flow of Funds Accounts,
available from the Federal Reserve System. These data are cross-referenced and mutually consistent,
so they form, for practical purposes, a unique source of information. Most of our experiments
use data for the Nonﬁnancial Corporate Sector. Speciﬁcally Table F102 is used to construct
measures of proﬁts before (item FA106060005) and after tax accruals (item FA106231005). To
these measures we add both consumption capital (item FA106300015) and inventory valuation (item
FA106020601) adjustments to obtain a better indicator of actual cash ﬂows. Investment spending is
gross investment (item 105090005). The capital stock comes from Table B102 (Item FL102010005).
Since stock valuations include cash ﬂows from operations abroad, we also include in our measures
of proﬁts the value of foreign earnings abroad (item FA266006003) and that of net foreign holdings
to the capital stock (items FL103092005 minus FL103192005, from Table L230) and investment
(the change in net holdings). Financial liabilities come also from Table B102. They are constructed
by subtracting ﬁnancial assets, including trade receivables, (Item FL104090005) from liabilities in
credit market instruments (Item FL104104005) plus trade payables (Item FL103170005). Interest
payments come from NIPA Table 1.16, line 35. All these are available at quarterly frequency and
require no further adjustments. Series for the aggregate economy come from NIPA.
Financial data come from CRSP and Ibbotson. We use the ten size portfolios of NYSE stocks
(CRSP series DECRET1 to DECRET10). Corporate bond data comes from Ibbotson’s index of
Long Term Corporate Bonds. The default premium is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the yields
on AAA and Baa corporate bonds, from CRSP. Term premium, deﬁned as the yield on 10 year
notes minus that on three-month Treasury bills, and the dividend-price ratio of the equally weighted
NYSE portfolio (constructed from CRSP EWRETD and EWRETX).36
36Dividend-price ratios are also normalized so that scaled and non-scaled returns are comparable.
56